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Tenured academics are not known for their firm grasp of reality.
Medical malpractice policy seems to be an exception.
In the thirty years that have passed since California adopted its par-
adigmatic malpractice reform legislation, the Medical Injury Compen-
sation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA),1 the health care system has
changed dramatically. Annual spending on health care in the United
States has risen from $300 billion to $1.6 trillion.2 Medical technology
has boomed, including new pharmaceuticals, diagnostic imaging tech-
niques and other novel tests for disease, and lifesaving treatments
such as coronary artery revascularization. Government dollars fi-
nance fifty percent of health care today, up from roughly thirty-five
percent in 1975, 3 and the few prototype HMOs that existed then have
given rise to a powerful managed care industry. Yet the fashion in tort
reform remains unchanged. Essentially all the pro-reform stakehold-
ers in the ongoing medical malpractice crisis continue to tout
MICRA's caps on non-economic damages and limitations on lawyers'
contingent fees as the ultimate in style, comfort, and durability. 4 The
anti-reform stakeholders counter that the price of MICRA-style re-
form is not worth paying, and challenge the connection between legal
claims and malpractice premiums, but ignore fundamental incompati-
bilities between conventional tort litigation and health care.5 Only the
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1. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) (codified at CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003), CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1997), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 340.5, 1295 (West 1982)).
2. Katharine Levit et al., Health Spending Rebound Continues in 2002, HEALTH AFF.,
Jan-Feb. 2004, at 147, 148.
3. Id. at 151.
4. See, e.g., Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2004.
H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004).
5. See generally, e.g., J. ROBERT HUNTER & JOANNE DOROSHOW, PREMIUM DECEIT: THE
FAILURE OF "TORT REFORM" TO CUT INSURANCE PRICES (2002).
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academy-meaning law professors, public health professors, econo-
mists, and health services researchers-seems able to gaze at MICRA
and see how shopworn it has become. Central to the academic per-
spective is an observation that is simultaneously obvious and startling:
solving the current malpractice crisis and avoiding future ones will re-
quire restructuring medical liability insurance.6 Why is this obvious?
Because a malpractice crisis is defined as a period when liability insur-
ance becomes scarce and expensive.7 Why is it startling? Because the
battle lines in medical malpractice reform were drawn between doc-
tors and lawyers decades ago and have not budged.8
A. Blind Spots
The principal political stakeholders in malpractice reform have de-
fined the conflict in terms of law and medicine. For over a century,
American physicians have regarded malpractice suits as unjustified af-
fronts to medical professionalism, and have directed their ire at plain-
tiffs' lawyers-whose wealth and reputation seem inversely
proportional to their own-and the legal system in which they oper-
ate. 9 Lawyers have responded with similar cautionary tales, accusing
physicians of sloth, greed, and incompetence. Neither side has offered
a sophisticated vision of productive interaction between the twenty-
first century health care system and contemporary legal, regulatory,
and self-regulatory institutions in order to reduce medical error and
compensate injured patients. Even more glaringly, neither side has
6. See generally, e.g., William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third. Liability Insurance and the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH Am., July-Aug. 2004, at 10. For an effort to integrate malprac-
tice policy with health policy, see INST. OF MED., FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH
CARE: LEARNING FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2003). For the
gold standard summary of research on medical malpractice, see Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for
Medical Malpractice, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1339 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph
P. Newhouse eds., 2000). For an important early article on liability insurance, see Gary T.
Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313
(1990).
7. Many reports have been issued that look at malpractice insurance as a business line, but
pay limited attention to the connection between malpractice policy and health care. See gener-
ally, e.g., CONNING & CO., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRESCRIPTION FOR CHAOS
(2001); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FAC-
TORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES (GAO-03-702, 2003); Eric Nordman
et al., Medical Malpractice Insurance Report: A Study of Market Conditions and Potential Solu-
tions to the Recent Crisis (Report presented to the NAIC's Property and Casualty Committee)
(Sept. 12, 2004), at http://www.naic.org/models-papers/papers/MMP-OP-04-EL.pdf.
8. See William M. Sage, The Lawyerization of Medicine, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1179,
1181-84 (2001).
9. For an historical perspective, see KENNETH A. DE VILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA: ORIGINS AND LEGACY (1990): James C. Mohr, American Medical
Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective, 283 JAMA 1731 (2000).
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taken serious account of the third pillar of malpractice policy: liability
insurance.
Both political constituencies-doctors and plaintiffs' lawyers-ap-
ply heuristics to liability insurance that misperceive its true nature and
policy importance. Because blame for malpractice crises can be de-
flected onto insurers as well as physicians, trial lawyers frequently tar-
get liability carriers when opposing tort reform.10 However, they do
so generically rather than taking on the specific structure and financ-
ing of malpractice insurance. The trial bar seems to view malpractice
insurers, like the insurance industry in general, simply as American
business writ large. Most lawyer-commissioned reports on the current
malpractice crisis, therefore, simply accuse liability insurers of pursu-
ing profits rather than serving the interests of their customers. 1
For their part, physicians fail to grasp the centrality of insurance
reform to malpractice reform because they unquestioningly regard
malpractice carriers as allies. This is true for reasons beyond the basic
fact that insurers provide physicians with defense counsel when law-
suits are filed against them. 12 The exodus of many commercial com-
panies during the malpractice crisis of the 1970s created a vacuum that
was filled by insurers with state and local medical society sponsorship,
many of which retain close financial and managerial ties to those orga-
10. See, e.g., Stewart Eisenhart, Condition Critical: Med Mal Liability Markets in Dire Need of
Resuscitation, INS. J., Sept. 30, 2002, http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/southcentral/
2002/09/30/features/23715.htm.
11. See, e.g., CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, A SHORT GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING To-
DAY'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE "CRISIS" (AND USEFUL QUESTIONS TO ASK) (Sept.
25, 2002), at http://www.centerjd.org/MediaGuide.pdf (presenting an advocacy document, the
first section of which is titled "Unregulated Corporate Greed"). Other reports link the relatively
slow rate of increase of malpractice premiums in California not to MICRA's damage caps, but to
a voter initiative restraining price increases for insurance and a strongly pro-consumer elected
insurance commissioner. See generally, e.g., FOUND. FOR TAXPAYER & CONSUMER RIGHTS,
How INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED DOCTORS' MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFOR-
NIA, AND How MALPRACTICE CAPS FAILED (Mar. 7, 2003), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/
healthcare/rp/rp003103.pdf.
12. Few day-to-day conflicts arise between physicians (the insured) and their liability carriers
(the insurers). Plaintiffs rarely pursue physicians' personal assets, in large part because juries at
trial tend to view physician defendants as well-intentioned even if negligent. See generally Tom
Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 275 (2001). It is also unusual for claims against physicians to fall outside the scope
of coverage. The most pronounced conflict has been over the right to settle without the physi-
cian's consent, mainly because settlements must be reported to the National Practitioner Data
Bank. See Lawrence E. Smarr, A Comparative Assessment of The PIAA Data Sharing Project
and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, 60 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 59, 71 (1997). However, state laws and accommodations by physician-sponsored mutual
insurance carriers have made even this issue less contentious in recent years.
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nizations. 13 Even when carriers that originated as physician mutuals
sever those affiliations or are acquired by other companies, physicians
often still feel professional kinship with the surviving entities. Be-
cause of the episodic nature of malpractice crises, physicians lobby in
behalf of insurers' interests when a crisis hits and coverage becomes
scarce, while simply ignoring insurance during non-crisis periods.
In recent years, the broader politics of tort reform has overtaken
efforts by various constituencies to enact comprehensive changes that
would apply only to medical liability. 14 In terms of both ideology and
campaign contributions, a deep divide now separates Republican and
business interests, who view litigation as an even greater threat than
government regulation to personal freedom and economic growth,
from Democratic and trial lawyer interests, who see entrepreneurial
lawyers getting their clients a day in court before a jury of their peers
as the last defense of individual rights against the predations of large
corporations. 15 Tort reformers, who face the uphill battle of changing
existing law, take every opportunity to plead their case for across-the-
board restrictions on lawsuits. A medical malpractice crisis is irresisti-
ble because the public respects physicians, and worries about the cost
and availability of health care. Opponents of tort reform refute these
assertions using equally general techniques, such as illustrating the
harshness of reform by identifying cases of egregious harm, or blam-
ing the crisis, if not always the underlying injuries, on corporate greed.
Neither side cares to debate the specifics of health care or the subtle-
ties of liability insurance because a nuanced discussion would both
threaten their political coalitions and take them off their core "law-
suits are bad" or "lawsuits are necessary" messages.
Physicians who wrap themselves in the mantle of tort reform tend
to overlook changes in health care that have exposed significant weak-
nesses in the traditional liability insurance model. It should come as
no surprise that people see the world selectively, and regard their
13. Organized medicine's opposition to the Clinton administration's enterprise liability propo-
sal is attributable in part to these connections. See David Rogers, Initial Clinton Medical Mal-
practice Reform Plan Pulled After Resistance by Entrenched Interests, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993,
at A20.
14. The American College of Physicians (ACP), for example, supported radical innovations in
liability policy in the mid-1990s. See generally American College of Physicians, Beyond MICRA:
New Ideas for Liability Reform, 122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 466 (1995) (proposing trials of no-
fault compensation and enterprise liability). By 2004, the organization had retreated to a pro-
MICRA agenda. See ACP, Affordable Professional Liability Insurance Necessary to Provide
Care, at http://www.acponline.org/hpp/menu/liability.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2005) (supporting
Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2002, H.R. 4600,
107th Cong. (2002)).
15. See Giovanna Fabiano, Election 2004, COURIER-NEWs, Aug. 16, 2004, 2004 WL 81172206.
466 [Vol. 54:463
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usual surroundings and routines as optimal simply because they are
familiar. Two important ides fixes for physicians involve fragmenta-
tion of medical practice and lack of external accountability for medi-
cal quality. American physicians regard themselves simultaneously as
independent professionals, entitled to set up small businesses and re-
ceive generous, separate payment for their individual services, and as
stewards of medical resources, empowered to control the hospital
care, pharmaceutical treatments, and other items they believe their
patients require. 16 Physicians carry a similar dualism over to quality
assurance, insisting that medical facilities and medical products be
subjected to strict legal and marketplace controls, but reserving to
themselves the right to police their own colleagues through licensing
boards, medical staff committees, and the like. As scholar Paul Starr
details, the medical profession that received assurances of clinical and
financial autonomy in exchange for supporting the enactment of
Medicare in 1965,17 and that persuaded many state legislatures to
adopt MICRA-style tort reform in 1975 and again in 1985,18 hoped it
had secured such privileges for all eternity.
As it turned out, the two decades that have passed since the last
malpractice crisis were a period of wrenching change for American
medicine. Previous malpractice crises occurred at the high-water
mark of financial success and professional independence for physi-
cians. Even rapid increases in physicians' malpractice insurance costs
could be passed on quickly and easily to health insurers in the form of
higher medical fees. 19 This is probably no longer true. "Cost contain-
ment" has been the principal policy objective of both private insurers
and the Medicare program since the 1980s. For example, the most
successful tool of managed care is physician fee contracting, 20 and
16. See generally Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Community Tracking Study: Benefits of and
Barriers to Large Medical Group Practice in the United States, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1958 (2003).
17. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 375-77 (1982).
18. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., COMPENDIUM OF SELECTED STATE LAWS GOVERNING MEDICAL INJURY
CLAIMS (1993); see also RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & BRIAN RAYMOND, KAISER PERMANENTE,
PATIENT SAFETY, JUST COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM 28-29 (Jan. 2003),
available at http://www.kpihp.org/publications/briefs/patient-safety.pdf.
19. See generally Patricia M. Danzon et al., The Effects of Malpractice Litigation on Physi-
cians' Fees and Incomes, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 122 (1990).
20. See Robert A. Berenson, Market Competition: Is That All There Is?, HEALTH AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 274, 275 (criticizing GEORGE HALVORSON & GEORGE ISHAM, EPIDEMIC OF
CARE: A CALL FOR SAFER, BETTER, AND MORE ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH CARE (2003), and




health insurers are understandably reluctant to renegotiate these
agreements every time physicians' input costs rise.
Third-party payers now emphasize cost containment because the
generosity of their earlier coverage created a health care system that is
both far better and far more expensive than it was thirty years ago.
Medical advances have enabled many serious diseases to be detected
at earlier stages, and treated more effectively, than was possible in
1970. Length and quality of life have improved for patients with
chronic health conditions. To achieve these results, physicians fre-
quently practice in interdisciplinary teams, and deploy an assemblage
of technologically sophisticated supplies and facilities. This process of
industrialization has brought corporate skills, and corporate risks, to
the forefront of health care delivery. Patient and public expectations
of health care have risen accordingly, as have salvage costs if some-
thing goes wrong. All of these factors increase the likelihood of mal-
practice litigation and worsen its financial implications for physicians.
The current malpractice crisis, therefore, is largely a product of
medicine's success, not its failure. 21 In addition, longstanding safety
problems in health care have been recognized and quantified, and new
ones have arisen. Coordinating care among multiple providers in-
creases opportunities for miscommunication, and corporate involve-
ment raises the risk of systematic harm, whether or not financially
motivated. Success has also bred self-awareness: professional ac-
knowledgment (and therefore public recognition) of high error rates
in medicine is largely the result of private employers' and insurers'
insistence on applying standard industrial techniques of quality mea-
surement and management to health care.22 Further destabilizing the
current environment is that the revolution in health care financing and
21. For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between health care system change and
medical liability, see William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Cen-
tury, in 2003 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 1-32 (Alice Gosfield ed., 2003). See also Mark F. Grady,
Why Are People Negligent: Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice
Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293, 293 (1988) (stating that "[n]egligence law is fundamentally a
creature of technology").
22. Although patient safety experts began applying industrial principles to the health care
system in the 1980s, it was not until 1999 that the Institute of Medicine of the National Acade-
mies of Sciences brought the issue into public and political debate. See generally INST. OF MED.,
To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
Significantly, much of the earlier work built on studies of the malpractice system, which had
revealed substantial amounts of previously undetected error. See generally HARVARD MEDICAL
PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITI-
GATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Inci-
dence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical




delivery that began in the 1960s and 1970s remains incomplete, and
suffers from internal tensions.23 Health care is not yet fully industrial-
ized, patient (or "consumer") focused, or universally accessible.
24
Whether these developments have stalled for political, commercial, or
social reasons, the health care system that exists today is in dise-
quilibrium, which itself magnifies the challenges the malpractice sys-
tem faces during downturns of the insurance cycle.
B. Seeing the Obvious
The articles by Tom Baker and Mark Geistfeld in this Symposium
make a strong case for insurance reform as a necessary component of
malpractice reform.25 Baker is a leading insurance law scholar;
Geistfeld is a leading tort law scholar. Both write eloquently, and
identify and analyze several fallacies and paradoxes that beset mal-
practice insurance markets. This Article attempts to distill from
Baker and Geistfeld's contributions a few "take-home lessons" for
malpractice policymakers. In keeping with this Article's metaphor of
the emperor's clothes, these "revelations" turn out largely to be self-
evident, at least in retrospect.
II. FIRST REVELATION: MALPRACTICE CRISES ARE
INSURANCE CRISES
Connecting malpractice crises to liability insurance should not be
rocket science. Malpractice came from nowhere to become
"medicine's most serious crisis" in 1975 because large numbers of
commercial insurers stopped or threatened to stop underwriting cov-
erage.26 The next crisis, in the mid-1980s, involved less upheaval
among underwriters but an even more pronounced run-up in premi-
23. During those decades, the medical professional paradigm that governed health care for
over a century was supplemented, though not replaced, by social communitarian programs such
as Medicare and, simultaneously, by market-oriented reforms such as managed care. See gener-
ally Clark C. Havighurst, special ed., Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 1; Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH
MATRIX 155 (2004).
24. See William M. Sage, Unfinished Business: How Litigation Relates to Health Care Regula-
tion, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 387, 398-414 (2003).
25. See generally Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005); Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Insurance and the (l)Legitimate Inter-
ests of the Medical Profession in Tort Reform, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 439 (2005).
26. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4, 5 (1991); Glen 0.
Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospective, LAW & CONTEMP.




ums, particularly for certain medical specialties. 27 The current mal-
practice crisis has been marked by both unavailability and
unaffordability of liability insurance. 28 Does anyone see a pattern
here?
The conventional wisdom, by contrast, attributes malpractice crises
to more frequent litigation and larger jury awards. Like much con-
ventional wisdom, this account is basically true but grossly incomplete.
As Baker explains, financial flows in liability insurance consist of pre-
mium payments and investment income entering, and claims pay-
ments and administrative costs leaving. 29 Of these components,
claims are by far the most important. They should be-they are the
raison d'etre for liability insurance. The main complicating factor
(even more than fragile risk pools, discussed below) is that long peri-
ods of substantial uncertainty elapse between when premiums are col-
lected and when claims are paid. As a result, trends in lawsuits and
awards do not map cleanly onto trends in premiums or insurance
availability.
That the malpractice crisis of the 1970s was seen as a litigation ex-
plosion is forgivable. Other than the medical profession itself, which
had long resented the insult to reputation inherent in malpractice liti-
gation,30 nobody had paid much attention to the malpractice system
before then, and certainly not to its insurance component. Moreover,
litigation rates in the 1970s seemed to have risen dramatically from
the near-zero baseline of the early 1960s,31 before Medicare's huge
infusion of cash into the health care system and the social and scien-
27. See generally John K. Iglehart, The Professional Liability Crisis: The 1986 Duke Private
Sector Conference, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1106 (1986).
28. Since 1999, liability insurance premiums have trended upwards nationally, and have in-
creased markedly for certain specialties in certain states. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 7. These premium increases were preceded by a prolonged "soft market" that ended
with the insolvency or market withdrawal of many insurers, and an increase in physicians cov-
ered by joint underwriting associations and other government-sponsored insurers of last resort.
See RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ANNA BARTOW, UNDERSTANDING PENNSYLVANIA'S MALPRAC-
TICE CRISIS: FACTS ABOUT LIABILITY INSURANCE, THE LEGAL SYSTEM, AND HEALTH CARE IN
PENNSYLVANIA 7-10 (Report of the Pew Charitable Trust Project on Med. Liability in Pa.. June
2003), available at http://medliabilitypa.org/research/report06O3UnderstandingReport.pdf;
FRANK A. SLOAN, PUBLIC MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 23-26 (Research Report of the
Pew Charitable Trust Project on Med. Liability in Pa., Mar. 2004), available at http://medliabili-
typa.org/research/files/sloan03O4.pdf; see also Rachel Zimmerman, Insurers' Malpractice Helped
Provoke Malpractice "Crisis", WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al (describing insurance pricing
practices during the 1990s).
29. See Baker, supra note 25, at 396.
30. For a speculative essay on the strong role reputation plays in malpractice policy, see Wil-
liam M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, in ACCOUNTABILITY: PA-
TIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004).
31. See Danzon, supra note 6, at 1355; see also Sage, supra note 8, at 1182.
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tific changes that both presaged and followed it. However, the argu-
ment that each subsequent malpractice crisis reflected surging
litigiousness requiring legal restraint is false. Baker's analysis clearly
shows that the shocks were insurance phenomena, while litigation
merely followed a steady upward trend.32 Malpractice liability is en-
demic to health care, not epidemic.
III. SECOND REVELATION: THE INSURANCE CYCLE
Is BEHAVIORAL
Physician perception has always been at the core of the medical
malpractice debate. 33 In the years between insurance crises, for exam-
ple, tort reform advocates often justify their position by citing wide-
spread "defensive medicine," which wastes resources and may harm
patients. Opponents counter that, even assuming that malpractice risk
is indeed the cause of questionable medical decisions, physicians over-
estimate the chance of being sued and the likelihood of being held
liable.34 Similarly, physician hysteria during insurance crises is consid-
ered proof enough for tort reform by some, while others insist on em-
pirical evidence that actual lawsuits are unjustified or that patients are
being denied health care. Should opinion suffice to drive public pol-
icy? Or should "hard facts" be required?
Baker's article demonstrates that perceptions drive the insurance
side of the malpractice system as much as the clinical (or legal) sides.
35
The insurance cycle is a flesh-and-blood phenomenon-what he calls
"fear and greed"-not a mechanical and hence immutable conse-
32. Baker, supra note 25, at 415. One can explain the sharp peak and subsequent falloff in
malpractice suits and awards that occurred during the two historical waves of tort reform legisla-
tion in various ways. For example, plaintiffs' lawyers may have rushed cases to the courthouse in
anticipation of adverse changes to the law, or juries may have reacted to publicity regarding
malpractice crises by displaying less sympathy for plaintiffs.
33. The legal system's perceptions also matter. A continuing concern of the medical profes-
sion is that judges and juries lack the technical expertise to determine malpractice liability, and
are ill-served by partisan expert witnesses. Certificates of merit, expert screening panels, and
"medical courts" are among the reform proposals that have been offered to improve the factual
underpinnings of malpractice litigation. See generally CATHERINE T. STRUVE, EXPERTISE IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: SPECIAL COURTS, SCREENING PANELS. AND OTHER OP-
TIONS (Report of the Pew Charitable Trust Project on Med. Liability in Pa., Oct. 2003), available
at http://medialiabilitypa.org/research/struvel003/StruveReport.pdf. Damages caps themselves
can be viewed as restraining jurors' "mere opinions."
34. See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MAL-
PRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 124 (1993) (reporting that physicians over-
estimate the likelihood of being sued by a factor of three).
35. See Baker, supra note 25, at 426.
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quence of economic forces beyond the control of policymakers. 36 At
any point, pricing is determined by the incentives and objective func-
tions of corporate managers, the competitiveness of particular mar-
kets, the division of power within organizations, and whether
particular employees feel optimistic or pessimistic about their busi-
nesses. Only perceptions, for example, can explain prolonged soft
markets for liability insurance.
Baker effectively refutes the notion that, following the 1970s exodus
of "commercial" companies, malpractice insurance returned to its fra-
ternal roots. 37 Capital market valuation, and therefore continued
growth, matters as much to most liability insurers as it does to other
public companies, while the regulatory environment (e.g., the mana-
gerial moral hazard of guaranty funds) offers special opportunities for
gamesmanship. 38 When sales and marketing departments are the cor-
porate darlings, pricing is aggressive and expansion unfettered; when
actuaries hold the cards, premiums rise and risk underwriting returns.
Actuarial estimates themselves are art as well as science, and a low-
frequency, high-severity, long-tail line of insurance such as medical li-
ability coverage is particularly prone to scatter in trend projections.
Recognizing that human fallibility drives all aspects of malpractice
system performance, including insurance, can be liberating for policy-
makers. Among other things, it answers the question about emotion
versus fact as a justification for reform. Opinions matter when opin-
ions drive behavior. How should regulators and legislators respond?
They should respond in the usual fashion: improve information,
change incentives, and when all else fails, constrain behavior directly.
IV. THIRD REVELATION: SPECIALTY-BASED RISK POOLS
ARE INEFFICIENT
A major contribution of Geistfeld's article is the argument that con-
ventional class rating of malpractice insurance based on specialty and
36. Opponents of damages caps also attribute malpractice crises to insurers' greed, but tend to
do so stridently and with uneven attention to internal inconsistencies in their arguments. Specifi-
cally, they berate insurers for mismanaging their assets in soft markets while simultaneously
vilifying them for profiteering during hard markets. Baker makes clear that greed drives soft
markets, while fear drives hard markets. See Baker, supra note 25, at 426. Insurers cannot
simply refrain from increasing premiums in hard markets; they lowered them too much in soft
markets. Regulators and consumers bear some responsibility for this pattern of behavior. A
common characteristic of auto insurance and malpractice insurance is that purchasers like low
prices and have sufficient political clout to discourage regulators from carefully scrutinizing pre-
mium discounting, particularly from new entrants.
37. See STARR, supra note 17, at 111 (describing early malpractice insurance arrangements).
38. Baker, supra note 25, at 427-28.
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geographic location is not preordained, and in fact is socially counter-
productive. 39 Physicians who perform delicate procedures (e.g., or-
thopedists and neurosurgeons), diagnose life-threatening but
potentially treatable conditions (e.g., radiologists and emergency phy-
sicians), or control health at birth (e.g., obstetricians), have the great-
est likelihood of being assessed very high damages in malpractice
litigation. Accordingly, a rational liability insurer in a competitive
market will charge them a premium commensurate with that risk. As
Geistfeld notes, however, this approach results in small, volatile risk
pools, particularly in geographic areas with few physicians in high-risk
fields.40 If physicians in these specialties find coverage unaffordable
and limit or abandon their practices, the entire health care system po-
tentially fails. Further, class rating does not serve other plausibly effi-
cient purposes. Society does not benefit if fewer physicians choose to
be obstetricians or neurosurgeons. Risk segregation is not needed to
avoid adverse selection because essentially all physicians buy malprac-
tice coverage.4' Finally, class rating does not reduce moral hazard-
physicians are charged premiums based on average, not individual,
loss experience.
42
39. Geistfeld, supra note 25, at 448-49.
40. Geistfeld concludes that geographic rating is similarly undesirable because it induces phy-
sicians to move from higher to lower risk communities, where they may be less satisfied with
their practices and less valued by the market. Geistfeld, supra note 25, at 447. Supporting
Geistfeld's position is the fact that physicians practicing in poor urban areas, who tend to be in
short supply because of low earnings and harsh working conditions, are particularly likely to pay
very high premiums using current rating categories. See BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 28,
at 27-33 (discussing geographic distribution of malpractice risk in Pennsylvania). On the other
hand, a longstanding problem in American health policy is physician scarcity in rural areas,
which also tend to have lower claims rates and juries who are friendlier to physicians. Geo-
graphic rating therefore acts as a crude inducement for physicians to relocate where they are in
fact needed, although Geistfeld makes a good point that rural markets remain volatile because
of the small numbers problem. For an overview of physician supply challenges, see COUNCIL ON
GRADUATE MED. EDUC., PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION AND HEALTH CARE CHALLENGES IN Ru-
RAL AND INNER-CITY AREAS (Tenth Report to Cong. and the Secretary of the Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., Feb. 1998), available at www.cogme.gov/rptl0.htm.
41. Adverse selection is selective purchasing of insurance based on differences in risk that are
unobservable by insurers. See generally Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Ad-
verse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371 (2002-2003). "Going bare" (prac-
ticing without insurance where legally permissible) is a desperation measure of high-risk
physicians during crisis periods, and typically involves both financial necessity and political ma-
neuvering. See, e.g., THE FLA. INS. COUNCIL, GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTH-
CARE PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 108 (Jan. 2003), available at www.doh.state.fl.us/
myflorida/DOH-Large-Final%2OBook.pdf (describing Florida physicians who decline liability
insurance).
42. Moral hazard is behavioral change resulting from the possession of insurance that is unob-
servable by insurers. For an overview of moral hazard in insurance law and regulation, see Tom
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
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Geistfeld's solution is surprisingly simple: Insurance regulators
should reject class rating under established insurance law as unfairly
discriminatory.43 Oddly, physicians who detest malpractice suits
rarely question the universal practice of charging premiums in accor-
dance with "legal risk." Why? There are several possible explana-
tions. First, both training and temperament lead physicians to
exaggerate the degree of control each individually exerts over his or
her patients. They see themselves, and only themselves, as responsi-
ble for care. 44 Second, physicians who bridle at suggestions about
their own malpractice often have little trouble believing that other
doctors are much worse than they, and should pay for the injuries they
inflict. Third, physicians by and large remain small businesspeople,
notwithstanding the overall industrialization of health care, and view
liability insurance as an individual cost of practice much like any other
rather than as a collective resource. Fourth, the physicians charged
the most for liability coverage in a class-rated system are often well-
paid surgical specialists, and generalist physicians resent the idea of
"subsidizing" the practices of their wealthier colleagues. Fifth, the in-
adequacies of specialty-based risk pooling tend only to be noticed dur-
ing insurance crises, when proposals for insurance reform are seen as
buying off the trial lawyers rather than eradicating the perceived
problem of excessive litigation.
Geistfeld correctly asserts that the aggregate level of malpractice
risk is less problematic than the distribution of risk.45 Even in crisis
times, malpractice premiums and self-funded reserves equal less than
two percent of national health care expenditures. 46 An important
qualification, however, is that growth and industrialization in the
health care sector over the past thirty years has created roughly a tril-
lion dollar annual gap between the revenues flowing through the
health care system, often at the direction of physicians, and those di-
43. See, e.g., TEX. INS. Art. 21.21-6 (2004) (prohibiting "unfair discrimination," including dif-
ferential rates based on geographic location, except where justified by "sound underwriting or
actuarial principles").
44. At a contentious 1993 meeting of the Physician Insurers Association of America, one irate
medical leader condemned the Clinton administration's enterprise liability proposal-which
would have held health plans rather than physicians responsible for malpractice-as "violating
[his] constitutional right to be sued." See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging
Managed Health Care System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 170 n.46 (1997). This outburst,
which is still widely recalled by those present, demonstrated that physicians see allegations of
negligence as personal attacks to be personally defended. The resulting dynamic is destructive
for both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs want their health restored; physicians want their
reputation vindicated. Litigation accomplishes neither.
45. Geistfeld, supra note 25, at 444.
46. See generally THE URBAN INST., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: PROBLEMS & REFORMS (1995);
Danzon, supra note 6, at 1369-70 (discussing costs of the malpractice system).
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rectly available to physicians to fund malpractice premiums. 47 Hospi-
tal services, medical devices, pharmaceutical, and the like are all
potential sources of injury and therefore liability, but physicians are
not paid to provide them. Nonetheless, tort law still holds physicians
primarily responsible for the consequences of their ordering and refer-
ral decisions (it also increasingly imposes direct liability on institu-
tional and corporate defendants).4 8  A serious question is whether
physicians in small-group practice are adequately capitalized to insure
so great an overhang of liability risk and potential premium volatility,
particularly now that medical fees have become constrained by regula-
tion and competitive contracting.
4 9
V. FOURTH REVELATION: POORLY STRUCTURED INSURANCE
"MISDETERS" PHYSICIANS
The relationship between malpractice liability and quality assurance
in health care remains unsettled. Tort reformers invoke a supposed
epidemic of "junk and frivolous lawsuits," not limited to medical mal-
practice, as justification for across-the-board measures to discourage
claims and reduce recoveries.50 On this account, the threat of mal-
practice litigation is unlikely to improve safety, and may in fact harm
medical quality through defensive medicine if physicians perform
costly tests and procedures without scientific justification or avoid car-
ing for seriously ill patients who might have poor clinical outcomes.
The Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS), still the most compre-
hensive research on medical error and malpractice litigation, con-
firmed a substantial mismatch between actual negligence and the
initiation or successful resolution of legal claims, which substantially
47. Physician and other clinician fees typically account for less than twenty percent of national
health expenditures. See Levit et al., supra note 2, at 148.
48. For a review of institutional liability in health care, see BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW 372-417 (2d ed. 2000).
49. The future medical care component of economic damages, little of which represents physi-
cian services, has grown rapidly as the health care system has expanded. In this respect, mal-
practice liability has become far more than a warranty of physician performance (putting aside
the question of non-economic damages). A physician who causes injury would not only be
pledging his or her personal services to make things right, but would also be promising to ar-
range or acquire an expensive array of outside products and services. Cf William S. Brewbaker
III, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Quality, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1997).
50. This is the tenor of most of President Bush's calls for malpractice reform. See, e.g., Presi-
dent George W. Bush, Remarks at the University of Scranton (Jan. 16, 2003), at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/
2 0 0 3 0116-I.html. See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE




weakens the deterrent effect of malpractice law. 51 On the other hand,
doctors who committed true malpractice were much more likely to be
held liable than doctors who did not,52 which accords with other stud-
ies concluding that jury determinations of liability are generally accu-
rate.53 Furthermore, the most surprising finding of the HMPS was
rampant underclaiming despite unexpectedly high rates of iatrogenic
injury and even negligence. 54 Proof of an actual epidemic of un-
prevented, uncompensated medical error, however, did not rehabili-
tate malpractice liability as an aid to quality. To the contrary, the
medical profession interpreted the Institute of Medicine's (IOM) at-
tribution of medical error to system failure, rather than individual in-
competence, as further evidence that malpractice litigation should be
scrapped in favor of voluntary reporting and self-regulation. 55
How does malpractice insurance influence deterrence and hence
quality? Some effects are well known. Insurance in general undercuts
deterrence by relieving bad actors of financial responsibility, espe-
cially where there is first-dollar coverage. Countering this moral haz-
ard for physicians' malpractice insurance is the existence of substantial
uninsured costs associated with incurring and defending legal claims,
including time spent, emotion invested, and reputation harmed. As
previously noted, malpractice insurance as currently priced also fails
to spur performance improvement because, for both statistical and po-
litical reasons, physicians are not individually experience-rated. The
best neurosurgeon in town pays the same for coverage as the worst
neurosurgeon, and substantially more than the worst psychiatrist or
endocrinologist. On the other hand, insurance risk management rec-
ommendations may promote quality, particularly if insurers use aggre-
51. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 22, at 7; see generally A. Russell Lo-
calio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results
of the Harvard Medical Practice Study Ill, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991). Only 1/8 of events
judged negligent in the study led to malpractice litigation, and only half of those were eventually
compensated. For every valid claim filed, roughly six were filed with respect to non-negligent
care. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1618-20 (2002).
52. See generally Michelle M. Mello & David Hemenway, Medical Malpractice as an Epidemi-
ological Problem, 59 Soc. SCi. & MED. 39 (2004).
53. See STRUVE, supra note 33, at 37-41.
54. Until the Harvard Medical Practice Study, it was thought that little actual malpractice
occurred. See generally, e.g., Louis J. Regan, Medicine and the Law, 250 NEW EN . J. MED. 463
(1954) (arguing that suits are groundless and urging doctors not to testify against colleagues).
55. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) report itself was more optimistic about systematic im-
provement from legal accountability, urging consideration of capped strict liability systems based
on enterprise liability. INST. OF MED., supra note 22, at 109-11; see also INST. OF MED., CROSS-
ING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 218-19 (2001).
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gate data to identify systematic quality problems, and communicate
best practices to their insureds.
56
Baker and Geistfeld take this analysis a step further. Baker shows
that volatility in the insurance cycle is likely to swamp any deterrent
signal, however attenuated, that malpractice liability might send indi-
vidual physicians about quality improvement.5 7 When premiums rise,
they rise significantly and regardless of risk; when underwriting stan-
dards tighten, they do so quickly and catch both good and bad physi-
cians in their net.58 A prerequisite for safer health care, therefore, is a
lower-amplitude, less volatile insurance cycle, with better modulated
incentives for insurers to reward clinical quality.
Neither Baker nor Geistfeld, however, offers a confident vision of
how malpractice insurance might be reformed so as to improve deter-
rence of poor medical care. Both struggle with the large number of
negligent injuries that currently go uncompensated and therefore un-
deterred. Baker even speculates that periodic medical malpractice
crises might be desirable because they provoke physicians into taking
the threat of malpractice liability far more seriously than objective ev-
idence regarding claims rates and outcomes would suggest.
59
Research into health care quality and efficiency helps explain why
this speculation misses the mark. One persistent problem in health
policy is maintaining incentives for health insurers to manage (i.e., im-
prove) health care delivery for members when they can profit more
directly merely by managing insurance risk.60 The analogy in the mal-
56. Two recent examples are anesthesia monitoring and vaginal birth after cesarean section
(VBAC). Standardization of equipment and procedures for delivering surgical anesthesia
greatly reduced anesthesiologists' malpractice exposure and liability insurance premiums. See
generally John H. Eichhorn et al., Standards for Patient Monitoring During Anesthesia at Harvard
Medical School, 265 JAMA 1017 (1986); Lori A. Lee & Karen B. Domino, The Closed Claims
Project: Has It Influenced Anesthetic Practice and Outcome?, 20 ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS OF N.
AM. 485 (2002). In part because of studies of malpractice claims, uterine rupture is now a recog-
nized, though uncommon, complication of VBAC. See generally Suneet P. Chauhan et al., Ma-
ternal and Perinatal Complications with Uterine Rupture, 189 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 408 (2003).
57. Baker, supra note 25. at 435.
58. State-administered joint underwriting associations have made matters worse. Established
when repeated allegations of malpractice were regarded as victimization by plaintiffs' lawyers
rather than an indication of poor quality, and before the extent of medical error was generally
appreciated, these high-risk pools allow physicians who have been turned down by private carri-
ers. even in soft markets, to continue to practice. States are beginning to revise these arrange-
ments, as by requiring physicians with poor malpractice histories to be evaluated by the state
medical board before Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) coverage is approved. See generally
SLOAN, supra note 28.
59. See Baker, supra note 25, at 435.
60. See generally, e.g., Sandra Shewry et al., Risk Adjustment: The Missing Piece of Market
Competition, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 171 (describing managed competition in California).
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practice context is the likelihood that physicians whose liability cover-
age is rated according to specialty and geography will respond by
seeking patients who are unlikely to suffer bad outcomes or file claims
rather than by practicing better medicine across-the-board.
A second problem-which played a central role in the IOM's attri-
bution of medical error primarily to "systems failure"-is physicians'
limited ability to improve safety even if they have financial incentives
to do So. 6 1 Ever since Wennberg and colleagues identified pro-
nounced variations in patterns of medical care from community to
community in the United States, health care purchasers and health
policy researchers have sought to explain these differences and estab-
lish benchmarks for high-quality medical practice.62 Chassin and col-
leagues made this very large problem substantially more tractable by
dividing health care quality failures into three classes: undertreatment,
overtreatment, and mistreatment. 63 While physicians' financial incen-
tives contribute significantly to quality failures, a large portion of
them-particularly in the third category-derive primarily from short-
comings in how the health care system disseminates information about
clinical "best practices" and translates physician knowledge into ac-
tual patient care.
Assessments of deterrent effect in malpractice scholarship would
benefit from a similar framework. Certainly, gross underdeterrence
or overdeterrence of physician malpractice would be problematic.
Even more worrisome, however, is the degree to which the malprac-
tice system creates "misdeterrence": clinical responses to the per-
ceived risk of liability that fail to advance quality of care. Studies of
"defensive medicine," for example, reveal that physicians who are
preoccupied with liability risk-particularly in an ongoing liability in-
surance crisis-order or perform large numbers of superfluous diag-
nostic tests on some patients, while avoiding other patients entirely. 64
Neither pattern of behavior benefits the public. Moreover, as with
quality of care generally, the fundamental problem is neither unskilled
nor uncaring physicians, but physicians who do not understand how to
61. INST. OF MED., supra note 22, at 49-68 (describing why medical errors happen).
62. John E. Wennberg, Practice Variations and Health Care Reform: Connecting the Dots,
HEALTH AFF. (Oct. 7, 2004), available at http://www.pnhp.org/news/2004/october/prac-
ticevariations_.php (discussing practice variation and patient safety); David E. Wennberg &
John E. Wennberg, Addressing Variations: Is There Hope for the Future, HEALTH AFF. (Dec. 10,
2003), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.614v1? (discussing variation and
Medicare policy).
63. See generally Mark R. Chassin et al., The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality:
Institute of Medicine National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000 (1998).
64. See generally DAVID M. STUDDERT ET AL., DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AMONG HIGH-RISK
SPECIALISTS DURING A MALPRACTICE CRISIS (2005).
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respond appropriately to liability risk and who do not practice in an
environment capable of translating perceptions of liability risk into
superior patient care.
The likely solution is reducing fragmentation and improving coordi-
nation of care through a greater institutional role in both liability risk-
bearing and clinical practice. In other words, the solution is enterprise
liability.65 As Geistfeld recognizes, moreover, better health care orga-
nizations will generally have better structured malpractice coverage.
66
Assigning liability to health care organizations that can hedge the por-
tion of coverage cost attributable to the insurance cycle (or separate it
from the portion attributable to risk experience) is potentially safety-
enhancing as long as the responsible enterprise (e.g., a hospital or
physician group practice) also has tools at its disposal to measure and
improve system-level safety. Physicians currently in academic prac-
tice, for example, enjoy a much more sensible liability environment
despite the higher acuity of their caseload. Academic health cen-
ters-which in essence bear enterprise liability because their physi-
cians are salaried employees-are diversified across a range of clinical
services. Aggregate coverage for academic health centers is negoti-
ated with commercial liability carriers on an experience-rated basis
that includes substantial risk retention (self-insurance) by the institu-
tion. Furthermore, liability costs for individual physicians are imputed
by the institution and incorporated into overall compensation ar-
rangements that factor in case volume and quality rather than being
charged directly to those physicians.
65. Several articles have been written about enterprise liability. See generally, e.g., Kenneth S.
Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American
Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REV. 381 (1994); Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability:
Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2000); William
M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 159 (1997); William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and
Health Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1994). Although early advocates of
enterprise liability urged legislative reform, recent voluntary trends toward including physicians
in hospital-based self-insurance programs or risk retention groups lead in the same direction.
See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 39-41; Michelle M. Mello et al., Hos-
pital Behavior in a Tort Crisis: Lessons from Pennsylvania, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at
225, 231-32 (describing market trends that are compatible with enterprise liability principles).
66. Geistfeld also supports further efforts to individually experience-rate physicians, which
(unlike class rating by specialty and geography) he regards as a legitimate form of discrimination
among insureds. Geistfeld, supra note 25. at 453. A more workable first step might be to ex-
pand premium discounts using process-based quality indicators, which are being developed by
health insurers as part of "pay-for-performance" initiatives. See generally David A. Hyman &
Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-Based Compensation and Health Care, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001).
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VI. FIFTH REVELATION: A BETTER LIABILITY SYSTEM
NEEDS SPEED
Delay is a very serious problem for medical malpractice policy.
Both Baker and Geistfeld describe the "tail" of malpractice coverage
as uniquely long.6 7 Malpractice claims take, on average, two years to
resolve, and large dollar claims typically take more than five years.68
Patients often do not know immediately that they have been injured
by medical care, and seldom suspect negligence. The extent of their
injuries, and therefore their incentive to sue, may not be apparent for
still longer. Legal discovery is complex and protracted, particularly
the process of engaging and debriefing expert witnesses. The expense
incurred by plaintiff's counsel in order to prepare a case for trial cre-
ates strategic incentives for further delay by defense counsel. Navigat-
ing procedural mechanisms such as pretrial screening panels may slow
things down even more. Finally, many of the most serious malpractice
claims relate to newborn or early childhood injuries, making the tail
even longer, because state law generally allows suit to be brought
many years after the fact so as not to prejudice the rights of minors.
The long tail of malpractice coverage makes premium pricing uncer-
tain, even for claims-made policies.69 Baker describes significant "de-
velopments risk"-much of it systematic-that makes malpractice
insurance underwriting a tough business. 70 Claiming behavior may in-
crease, as some commentators believe happened after the IOM's 1999
report heightened public awareness of medical error.7 1 Jurors may be-
come less sympathetic toward physicians when determining liability,
and more generous to plaintiffs when awarding damages. Medical ad-
vances may create new opportunities for missed diagnoses or botched
treatments.72 The cost of caring for injury may increase. A change in
67. See Baker, supra note 25, at 422; Geistfeld, supra note 25, at 454.
68. See Danzon, supra note 6, at 1369.
69. Until the malpractice crisis of the 1970s, malpractice insurance covered liability arising
from events of negligence that occurred during the policy year, regardless of how long it took for
a claim to be filed or a payment to be made. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 5-6. In
response to that crisis, many carriers began writing coverage that applied only to claims filed
during the policy year, which eliminated the uncertainty associated with the passage of time
between the occurrence and the filing (often many years for newborn or childhood injuries).
Most, though not all, malpractice coverage is currently written on a claims-made rather than
occurrence basis. See id. at 8.
70. Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 128, 130-39
(2004).
71. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors-
Could It Do Harm?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1123 (2000).
72. See Sage, supra note 21, at 7; see generally Mark F. Grady, Better Medicine Causes More




the law, either procedural or substantive, may open new avenues of
attack for plaintiffs. Because liability insurers hold premium dollars
for many years before paying them out to claimants, the long tail also
makes current pricing depend to a greater extent on investment in-
come than is typical of other forms of insurance. According to most
accounts, declining investment yields were a precipitating factor in the
"crisis of affordability" that threatened malpractice insurance markets
in the 1980s.
73
Delay resolving claims also impairs health care delivery and com-
promises patient safety. Insurers' financial interest in defending third-
party liability claims, combined with physicians' natural resistance to
confessing failure, typically keeps patients and their families in the
dark when medical errors occur.74 Monetary payment is rarely of-
fered until a formal claim is filed and discovery has commenced, even
though it is often needed much sooner. 75 The adversarial legal pro-
cess, once initiated, is alienating for both physicians and patients.
When a case is finally resolved, so much time has passed that there is
little chance that the health care providers involved will learn from
what happened. Considering these effects as a whole, it is fair to say
that malpractice reform proposals that speed up the process of surfac-
ing and resolving claims should be embraced, and those that hide
claims and further delay resolution should be rejected.
VII. SIXTH REVELATION: MALPRACTICE INSURANCE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE ARE CONNECTED
Most health care delivered in the United States is covered by health
insurance. Therefore, health insurers indirectly finance malpractice
coverage when they reimburse physicians, hospitals, and other provid-
ers. In addition, a significant amount of defensive medicine-particu-
73. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 7.
74. The advantages of early disclosure for patient well-being, quality improvement, and dis-
pute resolution are beginning to be appreciated. See generally Gerald V. Hickson et al., Patient
Complaints and Malpractice Risk, 287 JAMA 2951 (2002); Carol B. Liebman & Chris Stern
Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure of Errors and Adverse Events to Pa-
tients, 23 HEALTH AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2004, at 22; Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doc-
tors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994).
75. The largest physician insurer in Colorado, COPIC, recently began a pilot program called
"3Rs," in which physicians immediately report errors to the insurer and disclose them to the
patient. The insurer promptly offers the patient compensation without requiring a release of
claims. See COPIC, 3Rs PROGRAM NEWSLETTER (March 2004), available at http://callcopic.com/
publications/3rs/vol 1_issue l mar 2004.pdf. Thus far, incidents compensated under the pro-
gram have not given rise to lawsuits. An additional advantage of this approach from the physi-
cian's perspective is that, because payment is made before a claim is filed, the payment need not
be reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank.
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larly extra diagnostic tests and referrals to specialists-likely happens
only because health insurers pay the bills. At a deeper level, then,
private health insurance benefits, government financing of Medicare
and Medicaid, and state health insurance regulation determine how
much health care society considers "enough," while malpractice law
and malpractice insurance determine what society considers appropri-
ate to invest when "enough" isn't good enough. In other words, the
same health care dollars pay for care received before something goes
wrong and care received afterwards.
Yet malpractice insurance and health insurance act like two ships
that pass in the night. Health insurance is first-party insurance; cus-
tomers who suffer losses file claims. Result? Health insurers offer a
product that people with illness or injury value. 76 By contrast, mal-
practice insurance is third-party insurance. Physicians who buy mal-
practice insurance do not suffer losses; patients do. Result?
Malpractice insurers have no reason to care about illness or injury as
long as they can avoid or delay having their customers held responsi-
ble for it.77 Furthermore, it is nearly impossible for health insurers to
stick their heads in the sand when patterns of supply and demand
change in health care, while malpractice insurers adapt to the same
changes slowly and erratically at best. 78
76. This is an oversimplification, of course. Health insurance is often considered an aberra-
tional form of insurance, dealt with separately if at all in books on insurance law. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. JERRY. 11. UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 25-40 (2d ed. 1996). Users of health
insurance are not always the same as payers, which creates various tensions. See, e.g., MARK V.
PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOY-
MENT-BASED HEATLH INSURANCE 15-35 (1997) (discussing the economic incidence of health
insurance costs). In addition, health care involves small, predictable expenditures as well as
occasional, catastrophic needs. This leads health care consumers to seek to "use" their health
insurance in ways that would be hard to imagine for fire insurance or other property-casualty
coverage. See SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 83 (1997)
(describing disagreements over the benefits package for the Clinton administration's failed
Health Security Act). Where insurance is concerned, moreover, keeping customers happy may
include tolerating fraud. See Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty, The Policing of Risk, in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 238, 255-57
(Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
77. Automobile insurance is an interesting intermediate case. Traditional auto insurance is
third-party insurance, but claims are frequent and typically small, making it easier to assess risk
and harder to avoid payment. See SLOAN, supra note 28, at 13-16. In addition, any particular
insured driver is equally likely to enter the system as a plaintiff or a defendant. This reduces
support for damages caps and other simple tort reforms, and channels attention instead into no-
fault or similar systems, usually with exceptions for severe or egregious cases. For malpractice
insurance, of course, a no-fault system that excludes the most expensive cases accomplishes little.
78. Health insurance has a much shorter "tail." Physicians and other health care providers
request payment as vociferously for health insurance as they resist it for malpractice insurance.
State legislation and settlements reached in class action litigation have also assured prompt pay-
ment for services rendered by health care providers to members of managed care organizations.
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Baker and Geistfeld begin to confront these issues, though more
must be done to build a rational connection between liability insur-
ance and health insurance. For example, Geistfeld analyzes specialty-
based class rating from the perspective of an insured patient, and con-
cludes that beneficiaries with comprehensive health coverage are
poorly served by liability insurance practices that result in small, vola-
tile, undiversified physician risk pools. 79 Furthermore, as Geistfeld
notes, health insurance regulators regularly-and for the most part
successfully-require carriers to combine different levels of risk in or-
der to widen access to coverage.80 Geistfeld also sensibly frames the
malpractice issue as "safety versus dollars," which recognizes the com-
monalities between malpractice policy and other regulatory policy (in-
cluding health insurance) rather than indulging the persistent fiction
that cost is irrelevant to the standard of care in malpractice
litigation.
81
What are the next steps? First, because medical expenses comprise
a growing portion of malpractice damages, policymakers need to
reevaluate the exercise of subrogation claims by health insurers
against malpractice insurers to avoid further burdening the liability
insurance system with costs it is ill-prepared to bear.82 Second, policy-
makers should link financial relief for the malpractice crisis to selec-
tive improvements in safety and accountability within the health care
system, such as voluntary error reporting and analysis, better commu-
nication with patients and families, and pay-for-performance mecha-
nisms.83 The most straightforward way to accomplish this is through
health insurance, particularly the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
See generally, e.g., 2002 Mich. Pub. Act 316; 2002 Mich. Pub. Act 317 (codified at M.C.L.
500.2006 (2004)); Michael Chu, Cigna Settles with Health Care Providers, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
177 (2004). As a result, health insurers have little opportunity to invest premium dollars be-
tween receipt and payout, and health insurance premiums depend almost entirely on estimating
risk and managing treatment.
79. Geistfeld, supra note 25, at 449-50.
80. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113
YALE L.J. 1223, 1256 (2004) (describing the overall success of New York's community rating
law).
81. Geistfeld, supra note 25, at 442.
82. States that have adopted collateral source offset reforms, which preclude malpractice
plaintiffs from recovering damages payable from health or disability insurance, already have
limitations in place on subrogation claims. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1(b) (2004). More
generally, the affordability of comprehensive malpractice reform that would replace litigation
with a "no-trial" administrative approach depends on maintenance of effort from health insur-
ers. See generally David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No-
Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001).
83. See INST. OF MED., supra note 6, at 81. The authors propose that the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services should fund state-based demonstration projects for "patient-cen-
tered and safety-focused non-judicial compensation." Id. at 83.
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which for various reasons have never played a role in malpractice pol-
icy. Medicare-led malpractice reform would not only serve the inter-
ests of Medicare beneficiaries, but would also uproot decades of
political entrenchment during which government has ignored both the
insurance and the health policy aspects of the malpractice problem. 84
VIII. CONCLUSION
Tom Baker and Mark Geistfeld's contributions to this Symposium
offer detailed and persuasive analyses of medical malpractice insur-
ance. Their principal contribution to the malpractice reform debate,
however, is simple: confirming that liability insurers should not be left
to their own devices between malpractice crises or appeased during
crisis periods. Instead, liability insurance must be consciously de-
signed to help the health care system work toward its core goals of
high quality, broad access, and affordable cost.
In 2000, the IOM issued a follow-up report to its earlier indictment
of medical error, calling upon the health care system to become safe,
effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable. 85 The
medical malpractice system possesses none of these qualities, in large
part because of the incentives created by third-party liability insur-
ance. The inadequacy of the current insurance system should be read-
ily apparent to both market participants and malpractice reformers.
History and politics, however, have blinded them to the obvious. In
the topsy-turvy world of medical malpractice policy, grassroots con-
stituencies seem to have their heads in the clouds, while scholars peer-
ing out of the ivory tower somehow manage to see the lay of the land.
84. See Sage, supra note 6, at 20.
85. See INST. OF MED., supra note 55, at 5-6.
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